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5Abstract
6This article examines the conﬂict between traditional Marxist attitudes toward war and the problem
7of the nuclear revolution. It shows how the advent of the nuclear revolution in the 1950s undermined
8traditional Marxist-Leninist concepts of war, and then goes on to argue that this development must
9be placed at the centre of contemporary Marxian IR if it is to have explanatory power in the twenty-
10ﬁrst century. To make this case directly, it engages with Justin Rosenberg’s revival of Trotsky’s idea
11of uneven and combined development and its subsidiary law of ‘the whip of external necessity’, and
12argues that the whip can remain salient today only if one accepts the political utility of nuclear war.
13The impasse created by the nuclear revolution, it concludes, points Marxist IR in the direction of
14classic Marxist visions of supranationalism and human unity.
15Keywords
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17
Introduction
18Over the past decade or so, Justin Rosenberg and other International Relations (IR) theorists have
19sought to revive Marxism as a structural theory that can explain geopolitical behaviour in both the
20past and present. Rosenberg argues that Leon Trotsky’s idea of uneven and combined development
21(hereafter UCD) can provide us with a sociological theory that surpasses even structural realism in its
22ability to conceptualise the international. UCD portrays a more dynamic and convulsive international
23order than does structural realism, as the relentless imperatives of global capitalism push states into a
24frenetic and uneven competition that ‘Defensive’ Realists like Kenneth Waltz cannot readily explain.1
25A central component of UCD is the geopolitical pressure upon states to survive in a violent inter-
26national order, which Trotsky called the ‘whip of external necessity’. States pursue economic
27development not only for conventional reasons of wealth and proﬁt, but also because they need it to
28build modern and powerful military forces to fend off the predation of their enemies. Thus a major
29part of UCD reasoning allies quite directly with Realist IR, which places state security in a dangerous
30international environment at the heart of its theorising.2
1 Justin Rosenberg engages closely with Waltz’s defensive realism in ‘Kenneth Waltz and Leon Trotsky: Anarchy
in the mirror of uneven and combined development’, International Politics, 50:2 (2013), pp. 183–230. More
thorough reference to Rosenberg’s writings and other work on UCD can be found in Section II. For a version of
structural realism that does seek to explain relentless competition in terms of security, see John Mearsheimer,
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).
2 On this point, see especially Andrew Davenport, ‘Marxism in IR: Condemned to a realist fate?’, European
Journal of International Relations, 19:1 (2013), pp. 27–48.
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31Yet Rosenberg and other contemporary Marxist scholars have so far not tried to reconcile the ‘nuclear
32revolution’ – the advent of thermonuclear bombs and intercontinental missiles, the prospect of omni-
33cidal war it raises, and the effect of this prospect on state behaviour – with the traditional understanding
34of interstate conﬂict as Trotsky viewed it a century ago.3 The kind of war Trotsky and many of his
35contemporaries regarded as a natural and indeed historically necessary outcome of UCD and the
36imperatives of the whip now portends catastrophe of possibly existential levels, a problem that threatens
37UCD’s salience in the nuclear age. For if Rosenberg and other UCD theorists accept that its novel
38dangers mean that a decision to wage nuclear war is too dangerous to ever be politically or morally
39justiﬁed, then they must regard the whip, at least insofar as it applies to nuclear states, as something too
40risky to wield. If so, then one of UCD’s two conceptual foundations and its most important means
41of explaining violent conﬂict among major powers must be removed from its praxeology.
42Alternatively, if they maintain that the whip continues to be salient with respect to nuclear states,
43then these scholars must accept that the waging of nuclear war remains politically and morally
44thinkable.4 They must accept this condition, because otherwise the conﬂict and war they foresee
45culminates only in a politically meaningless nuclear catastrophe. For UCD, as Trotsky conceived of
46it, to apply today, nuclear powers must be able to ﬁght and win nuclear wars, and, crucially, the
47world after such wars must remain in a political condition where uneven and combined development
48among states can continue on as before.5
49This article asks how Marxism has dealt, and can deal, with this problem. How can Marxist
50conceptions of geopolitics contend with the novel implications of the nuclear revolution? I attempt to
51answer this question in two ways. First, I provide an historical account of the Soviet Union’s
52engagement with precisely this problem, focusing ﬁnally upon Nikita Khrushchev’s rejection of the
53traditional Marxist-Leninist approach to inevitable intra-imperialist war and his turn toward
54peaceful coexistence in the late 1950s.6 Second, I then explore in detail how Rosenberg’s
3 Marxists in the West have of course criticised the nuclear problem in political idealist terms, but rarely in the
analytical and theoretical sense Rosenberg, and Tolstoy, demand. For larger discussions of Marxist engagements
with geopolitics, see Alexander Anievas, Capital, the State, and War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
2014); Alexander Anievas, ‘Introduction’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 22:1 (2009), pp. 7–8; Alex
Callinicos, ‘Does capitalism need the state system?’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20:4 (2007),
pp. 533–49; W. B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Tolstoy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 67; Davenport, ‘Marxism in IR’; Karel Kara, ‘On theMarxist
theory of war and peace’, Journal of Peace Research, 5:1 (1968), pp. 1–27; Bruno Teschke, ‘Geopolitics’,
Historical Materialism, 14:1 (2006), pp. 327–35; and Hannes Lacher, ‘Making sense of the international system:
the promises and pitfalls of contemporary Marxist theories of international relations’, in Mark Rupert and Hazel
Smith (eds), Historical Materialism and Globalization (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 147–64.
4 Of course, as Scott Sagan and many others have shown, nuclear war could occur unintentionally, as a result of
inadvertence or accident. Indeed, I regard this possibility, at least at present, as the most likely cause of a
nuclear war in the contemporary era and a central reason to support radical policies of nuclear war-avoidance.
However, the argument here is about the intentional waging of nuclear war – the decision to ﬁght one for
perceived ends of national policy. It is this latter kind of decision that serves as the explanandum for Trotsky’s
whip of external necessity and indeed attempts to account for war from many IR perspectives.
5 As Stalin said to his interlocutor Milovan Djilas in 1945, the nations devastated by the war will recover in
ﬁfteen or twenty years, and ‘then we’ll have another go at it’. Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New
York: Harcourt Brace, 1962), p. 115. Also see WilliamWohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perception
During the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 62–5, 82–5.
6 I do not mean to suggest here at all that Soviet views on war are the last, or only Marxist word on this topic,
but that Moscow’s reckoning with the bomb gives us a unique insight into the collision between Marxist
conceptions of geopolitics and the nuclear revolution as it played out in the actual practice of international
Campbell Craig
2
55neo-Marxist revival of UCD and so his reliance upon the logic of the whip of external necessity runs
56into the same dilemmas Khrushchev faced. In a conclusion, I suggest, following R. N. Berki, that this
57dilemma can be overcome if Marxist IR turns away from interstate geopolitics and toward classic
58Marxist notions of supranationalism.
59The argument here speaks to larger questions of concern to all scholars of security studies. On one
60hand, the close connections between the theorising of Marxist geopolitics with non-Marxist, and
61particularly Realist theories ought to be of primary interest to scholars interested in materialist/
62structuralist explanations of the contemporary international; indeed, this is one of Rosenberg’s
63explicit aims as well. Cold War politics and the demise of the Soviet Union created a divide between
64the two schools of thought that their epistemological similarities do not justify.7 On the other, my
65interrogation of UCD in the nuclear age raises the more general question of whether any theory of
66interstate politics can really be reconciled with the nuclear revolution, a question I deal with in
67previous, and forthcoming, work.8
68
Marxism, inevitable war, and Khrushchev’s nuclear revolution
69In the original formation of Marxist thought, international power politics and war were classiﬁed as
70aspects of the superstructure: as effects of the class conﬂict engendered by economic modes of
71production, rather than as independent phenomena. As Berki puts it, ‘international relations and
72conﬂict inhabit a world at a second remove from relations and conﬂicts that are really signiﬁcant’.9
73To be sure, Marx, and particularly Engels, analysed the problem of modern war episodically, and
74indeed Engels paid close attention to it in his attempts to conceive of a military strategy of proletarian
75revolution. Both of them, moreover, acknowledged that armed conﬂict seemed to characterise
76intersocietal relations since the beginning of history, and that it therefore might derive from some
77political source independent of modern economic relations. But war for them remained secondary to
78the pressing issue of nineteenth-century capitalist class conﬂict. It would disappear as a problem after
79the working-class revolution, the objective to which they naturally devoted their primary political
80attention.10
politics. For a defence of this approach, see particularly Adam Humphreys, ‘The heuristic application of
explanatory theories in international relations’, European Journal of International Relations, 17:2 (2011),
pp. 257–77.
7 Afﬁnity between the two theories was far more common during the interwar period: see, inter alia, Niebuhr
Reinhold, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Scribners, 1932) and E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’
Crisis: 1919–1939 (London: Palgrave, 2016 [orig. pub. 1939]). Also see Jonathan Joseph,Hegemony: a Realist
Analysis (London: Routledge, 2002)and Rosenberg, ‘Kenneth Waltz and Leon Trotsky’.
8 See Campbell Craig, Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and
Waltz (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); and Craig, ‘International Relations theory and the
nuclear revolution’ (work in progress).
9 R. N. Berki, ‘On Marxian thought and the problem of international relations’, World Politics, 24:1 (1971),
p. 82. Also see Davenport, ‘Marxism in IR’, pp. 28–9; Bernard Semmel, Marxism and the Science of War
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 1; Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 69; Margot Light,
The Soviet Theory of International Relations (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1988), pp. 210–12; Benno Teschke,
‘Marxism’, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Relations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 163–87.
10 Berki, ‘OnMarxian thought and the problem of international relations’, pp. 84–5; Callinicos, ‘Does capitalism
need the state system?’; Alan Gilbert, ‘Marx on internationalism and war’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 7:4
(1978), pp. 346–69; Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, pp. 68, 73–4.
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81As several writers have suggested, Marx and Engels were surely inﬂuenced by the environment in
82which they wrote, a Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century that was characterised above
83all by apparent great-power stability – there had been no major war since Napoleon – and the stark
84inequalities and working-class turmoil in the emerging capitalist states. For them, the dominant story
85of their time was severe industrial exploitation in Europe (and the United States) and the rise of
86domestic political movements in response. The international scene was less convulsive. That,
87according to this narrative, was why they were notoriously unable to anticipate the decisions by
88working-class parties across Europe to support their nations’ march to war in the summer of 1914.11
89There is more to that story, however. Engels discerned that major war could serve as an agent of
90progressive change, which was how he regarded the French revolution and Napoleonic wars. As the
91conservative diplomats at Vienna feared, international turmoil could foment domestic revolution,
92just as internal crises could trigger war. Marx and Engels agreed that certain kinds of wars, especially
93those fought for the achievement of bourgeois national independence from feudal imperial rule, were
94certainly on the right side of history.12
95However, these kind of domestic political crises and regional wars were not triggering the general
96political upheaval both men wished to see.13 As Walter Bryce Gallie put it, perhaps only major war
97among the leading capitalist states in Europe would provide ‘the opportunity, or act as the catalyst
98for, an effective revolutionary uprising’.14 This led to a well-known intra-Marxist debate during the
99early twentieth century, but for Russian revolutionaries operating during the First World War, the
100answer was obvious. War was the encompassing condition of European politics, and it was war that
101would clear the way for revolutionary action.15
102The two dominant ﬁgures of the Bolshevik revolution, Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky, had no
103doubts about this. Trotsky’s account of the Russian revolution, and his role in it, states simply that
104the Great War created the necessary conditions for Bolshevik victory in 1917. The ‘entire course of
105the revolution’, he argued in The Lessons of October, would have been ‘altogether different, if at
106the moment of revolution there had not been in the country a broken and discontented army of
107many millions’.16
108Moreover, Trotsky’s more academic consideration of international politics regarded great-power
109conﬂict as an agent of progressive change, something he believed was taking place at that moment.
110His idea of uneven and combined development regarded the unbalanced competition among more
111and less developed states as a particularly volatile feature of international capitalism. Central to this
112argument was the whip of external necessity, the pressure upon states to maximise their wealth in
113order to develop the technologies and armies required to defend themselves against more modern
11Gilbert, ‘Marx on internationalism and war’; Berki, ‘On Marxian thought and the problem of international
relations’, p. 89.
12 Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, pp. 90–2; Semmel, Marxism and the Science of War, p. 6; Sigmund
Neumann and Mark von Hagen, ‘Engels and Marx on revolution, war and the army in society’, in Peter Paret
(ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 264.
13 Neumann and von Hagen, ‘Engels and Marx on revolution’, pp. 268, 272–8.
14 Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 90; Anievas, Capital, the State, and War, pp. 41–2.
15 Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War, p. 69; Neumann and von Hagen, ‘Engels and Marx on revolution’,
p. 269; Semmel, Marxism and the Science of War, pp. 13, 153–6.
16 Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, Volume I: The Overthrow of Tsarism (New York:
Pathﬁnder, 1980), p. 28.
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114rivals. The whip of external necessity was an essential part of UCD because it explained the urgency
115with which governments sought to modernise, and their frequent focus upon, as Baruch Knei-Paz
116puts it, ‘economic-military’ rather than ‘economic-social’ development.17 Trotsky foresaw a world in
117which developed states would be in incessant competition at the international level, while their
118working classes simultaneously worked for revolution domestically. War was the ‘inevitable’
119outcome of a hyper-competitive international capitalism, and it would ﬁttingly prove the catalyst
120of its demise.
121It was this latter insight that led Trotsky to endorse the Bolshevik project to seize power and
122establish a Soviet state immediately in October 1917, even though the working class of Russia
123was miniscule and there appeared to be no corresponding revolutions erupting elsewhere in
124Europe. As Trotsky stresses in his history of the revolution, had Lenin not seized the opportunity to
125grab power in the autumn of 1917, the revolutionary cause in Russia would have ebbed away
126and then been crushed by imperialist forces. Trotsky oversaw the creation of the Red Army and worked
127tirelessly for the survival of the new Soviet regime because he believed that only as a functioning and
128defensible state could the USSR act as a base to export revolution throughout postwar industrial Europe
129on a permanent basis. The spreading of revolution to the rest of the industrialised world, in turn, would
130be necessary if the Soviet state were to survive over the long term.18
131Lenin, if anything, placed war even more centrally within his political project than Trotsky. It was his
132view, expressed before and after the revolution, that the imperialist stage of capitalism, with its
133frantic competition for territory, resources, and markets, made interstate war inevitable. Indeed,
134he called the period of late capitalism (as he thought it would be) the ‘epoch of wars and revolutions’.
135As Margot Light and Bernard Semmel show, Lenin believed that three kinds of wars would deﬁne
136this epoch. Wars among the imperialist states were the ‘locomotive of history’, the international
137events that would play a decisive part in determining when and where revolutions occurred. Wars of
138national liberation, bourgeois or socialist, took place on the domestic level, and reﬂected the
139dialectical advance of political history. Finally, there were the wars that imperialist states would
140wage against socialist ones. By exporting revolution throughout Europe and North America the new
141USSR would give the capitalists further reason to attack it, and the new socialist state was far from
142being able to defend itself against such an assault.19
143Lenin, therefore, regarded war and revolution as inexorable outcomes of the contemporary order no
144less, and probably more, than did Trotsky. He believed that intra-imperialist war was inevitable,
145and that proletarian victory over the bourgeois state was ‘impossible’ without revolution. ‘True
146Marxism’, Lenin wrote, ‘was based on violence’.20 Socialism in one country was not a policy of
147coexisting forever peacefully with the capitalists, but one of coping with the whip until the global
148revolution began.21
17 Baruch Knei-Paz, The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978),
p. 89.
18 On this point, see especially Ian Thatcher, ‘Uneven and combined development’, Revolutionary Russia, 4:2
(1991), pp. 246–9.
19 Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations, pp. 212–14; Semmel, Marxism and the Science of War,
p. 7. Also see Kara, 'On the Marxist theory of war and peace’, p. 5
20 Quoted in Semmel, Marxism and the Science of War, p. 16. Also see Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War,
p. 96, and Kara, 'On the Marxist theory of war and peace’, p. 15.
21 Claims that Lenin foresaw, and advocated, a ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the West are thus overdrawn. Lenin
spoke about coexistence, but only as a temporary expedient, in opposition to demands for immediate
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149The process of justifying, or rationalising, this preference for state survival over spreading
150proletarian revolution reached a new level with Lenin’s successor Stalin. Though he had, of course,
151repudiated Trotsky, writing him out of Soviet history and eventually ordering his assassination in
152Mexico, he adopted Trotsky’s idea of the whip of external necessity in toto. Stalin’s view, in
153hindsight probably an accurate one, was that the USSR had to industrialise rapidly in the 1930s lest
154it be crushed in the next intra-imperialist war.22 That meant harnessing national resources toward
155the single objective of developing modern armed forces, avoiding blatant support of foreign
156revolutionary movements for fear of provoking the capitalists, and, for Stalin’s own sociopathic
157purposes, destroying every last remnant of internal resistance to either his industrialisation campaign
158or his own position as dictator of the USSR. Lenin’s decision to privilege socialism in one country
159over the advancement of world revolution had been driven by his belief that the inevitability
160of imperialist war threatened the Soviet experiment and hence socialism; Stalin took this logic to
161its extreme in the face of the Nazi threat.
162The prospect of atomic war led many in the West to demand an alternative to an interstate order that
163seemed inexorably to lead to a nuclear Third World War, and this problem would soon be discussed
164in Moscow, as we shall see. For Stalin, however, nothing had really changed. In 1947 he denounced
165talk of peaceful coexistence, which could not withstand capitalist aggression.23 And not long before
166his death, Stalin wrote about the ‘peace movement’ and the arguments of the Comintern intellectual
167Eugen Varga, who suggested that intra-capitalist war was no longer certain. It was of course good,
168‘even very good’, that movements in the West were demanding peace and threatening to remove
169‘warmongering’ governments. But ‘this will not sufﬁce to remove the unavoidability of war between
170the capitalist countries’, Stalin said. ‘To eliminate the unavoidablility of war, it is necessary to
171destroy imperialism.’24 Here, in a few words, is an apt summary of the Soviet/Marxist attitude
172toward war and power politics up to 1953.25
173The three dominant ﬁgures of early Soviet politics – Trotsky, Lenin, and Stalin – all regarded major war
174as an inevitable, and the central, feature of international relations, and so they naturally chose to
175incorporate it fully into their approach toward socialism at home and policy abroad. The threat of
176imperialist war and the ensuing extinguishing of the Soviet state pushed the USSR’s leaders steadily
177toward survivalist policies that shelved the imperative of fomenting violent revolution in the indus-
178trialised world. But this did not mean, at all, that they had abandoned Marxist interpretations of world
179politics altogether. Their belief in inevitable intra-imperialist war and the whip of external necessity
180merely intensiﬁed Lenin’s and Stalin’s drive to create a defensible Soviet state, from which it might
revolution: he did not believe that the ultimate victory over capitalism could come about peacefully. See Kara,
‘On the Marxist theory of war and peace’, p. 20; Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations, p. 31;
also Geoffrey Roberts, Molotov: Stalin’s Cold Warrior (Sterling, VA: Potomac Books, 2011). I am grateful to
Alex Anievas for his comments on this matter.
22 Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations, pp. 32–3, 215.
23 Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations, p. 37.
24 Quoted in Kara, 'On the Marxist theory of war and peace’, fn. 38; also see Semmel, Marxism and the Science
of War, p. 273; Kara, 'On the Marxist theory of war and peace’, pp. 19–20; and Light, The Soviet Theory of
International Relations, pp. 15, 215–16.
25 Stalin originally made this statement in part one of Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (Moscow:
International, 1952). Karel Kara, writing from an ofﬁcial (Brezhnev-era) Soviet Bloc perspective, pointed out in
‘On the Marxist theory of war and peace’ (p. 21) that Stalin ‘failed to appreciate the new situation as it had
evolved in the post-war period, especially due to the invention of thermonuclear weapons and the changing
situation in the world’.
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181someday become possible to resurrect a project of global revolution. In Stalin’s case, these assumptions
182surely underlay his unhesitating rejection of American overtures after the war to build a new world
183order, and his continuing belief that a third world war was inevitable even in age of atomic bombs.
184Stalin’s death in early 1953 preceded by only a few months the Soviet test of a thermonuclear device,
185matching the US effort of a year earlier. The bombs that both superpowers had now built were
186capable of unleashing a destructive blast perhaps a thousand times as powerful as the ones that
187destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Both nations began working to mass-produce these weapons,
188and to develop long-range missiles that could deliver them to the other side in a matter of hours. This
189marked the advent of the nuclear revolution, whereby a total war (like the Second World War),
190fought with the most destructive weapons at each belligerent’s disposal, could lead to the social and
191political extinction of all nations ﬁghting it and threaten the existence of the human race.26
192Even before Stalin’s death, Georgi Malenkov, who would for a time emerge as the leading contender
193to replace him, argued that the advent of thermonuclear weapons meant that the competition
194between the two Cold War powers would have to become a peaceful one, and that this was a
195competition the USSR could win. This issue constituted one of the main issues of contention
196between Malenkov and his apparent chief rival for power, the long-time foreign minister Vlachyslav
197Molotov. In a 1955 debate Molotov earthily took Malenkov to task for his revisionism, declaring
198that ‘Marx foretold the end of capitalism, so anyone who said that nuclear war threatened the end of
199civilisation didn’t have his head on his shoulders, but at the other end of the body’.27 Molotov was
200only iterating the core assumption of Soviet policy since Trotsky: the end of capitalism would come
201through war, so to say that war was no longer possible was to reject Marx.28
202Khrushchev, early in the succession struggle, sided with Molotov: but this was only for tactical
203reasons. As Malenkov’s position receded, Khrushchev switched sides and began to attack Molotov
204on this very point. The veteran foreign minister’s reply, as historian David Holloway shows,
205conﬁrms for us his traditional position:
206If imperialism and socialism could keep to themselves, [argued Molotov] then ‘pray, what are
207we living for?’ It was an illusion to think that communism could be reached by way of peaceful
208coexistence: ‘We ought to preserve peace, but if we, besides ﬁghting for peace and delaying
209war, if we also believe that it is possible to get to communism that way, than that is deception
210from the point of view of Marxism, self-deception, and deception of the people.’
211Not long after his rise to the top of the Kremlin in early 1955, Khrushchev decided that Molotov’s
212thinking had become obsolete: nuclear weapons had invalidated the traditional Soviet view of
213interstate war. At the twentieth party congress in the summer of 1956, he announced his decision.
214The advent of thermonuclear weaponry had put an end to the presumption that violent conﬂict with
215the capitalist world was inevitable. Now, the policy of the Soviet Union and the communist world at
26 On the nuclear revolution, see Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1989); Daniel Deudney, ‘Nuclear weapons and the waning of the Real-state’,Daedalus, 124:2
(1995), pp. 209–31; and Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth (New York: Knopf, 1982).
27 Quoted in William Taubman, Khrushchev: the Man and his Era (New York: Norton, 2004), p. 266.
28 Margot Light summarises Molotov’s view: peace allows the building of socialism, but ‘it must also delay
international revolution. If war exposes and aggravates the endemic conﬂict within bourgeois society … it is
only logical to suppose that peace must delay this process which promotes the speedier establishment of
socialism’. Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations, pp. 39–40. For a contrasting view of Molotov,
see Roberts, Molotov: Stalin’s Cold Warrior.
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216large must be one of ‘peaceful coexistence’, whereby the two camps would eschew direct conﬂict and
217learn to live with another indeﬁnitely. It was that, Khrushchev plainly said, ‘or the most destructive
218war in history. There is no third way.’29 This new order, as he spelled out at the congress and in later
219declarations, would require greater cooperation between the two sides, the formal rejection of war as
220a suitable means of resolving international conﬂict, and the strengthening of the principles
221of national sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of all nations.
222Peaceful coexistence represented a thorough renunciation of the core Soviet approach to war and
223conﬂict. Not only was the inevitability of war, or at least war between the two Cold War superpowers,
224ruled out; so was the imperative of actively fomenting violent revolution in the industrial West – there
225was no other way to interpret Khrushchev’s emphasis upon sovereignty and non-interference.30 More
226orthodox communist regimes, notably the People’s Republic of China, regarded peaceful coexistence
227as little more than ‘selling out to the capitalists’, as Margot Light has put it.31 Molotov’s earlier
228criticisms remained on target: if coexisting with theWest was now the pre-eminent objective, then what
229really was the USSR’s purpose? Almost immediately, Khrushchev’s position was denounced as ‘revi-
230sionism’ not only by Marxists in China and elsewhere, but also by Soviet military and political critics
231of Khrushchev (who would later employ this charge when deposing him in 1964).32
232Khrushchev answered this by insisting that the victory of socialism would now come by means of
233non-military competition and turning the attention of Soviet foreign policy toward the ‘Third
234World’. The USSR would win its struggle with the West by outperforming it in peaceful pursuits,
235such as technological innovation and providing a decent material life for the masses. This is what
236Khrushchev meant when he told several Western diplomats that ‘We will bury you’ in November of
237that year. Moreover, insofar as the two superpowers would continue to compete aggressively, this
238would now take place in the decolonising world, where, Khrushchev reckoned, the Soviet Union
239could spread a socialist vision to peoples inclined toward anti-Western politics. The abolition of
240capitalism, wrote Kara, would come about ‘not as a result of war with the socialist countries but as
241a result of the maturing of changes that are an objective necessity with the capitalist countries’.33
242As Light notes, claims such as this, clearly at odds with previous Soviet policy, represented ‘an act
243of theoretical cap-dofﬁng to an outdated tenet which cannot be explicitly abandoned’.34
244The nuclear revolution removed systemic war from the Soviet programme, and Khrushchev’s
245recognition of this reality, which was not predetermined, was one of the most important political
246decisions of the twentieth century. But, as Timothy Naftali and Aleksandr Fursenko show, he took a
247second, and equally important lesson from it as well.
29 Quoted in Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations, pp. 46–7.
30 See Kara, ‘On the Marxist theory of war and peace’, fn. 34.
31 Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations, p. 49.
32 See Semmel, Marxism and the Science of War, pp 30–3; Sergey Radchenko, Two Suns in the Heavens (Palo
Alto: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 64–7. The American response to the nuclear revolution was eerily
similar to the Soviet one. The US president Dwight Eisenhower reached identical conclusions to those of
Khrushchev about the absurdity of major war at precisely the same time, and adopted a (secret) policy of war
avoidance just as Khrushchev did. This policy, eventually adopted by his successor John F. Kennedy, was later
denounced by US military and political hard-liners for their own political and economic advancement – just as
was the case in the USSR. See Semmel,Marxism and the Science of War;Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall,
America’s Cold War: the Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), ch. 5.
33 Kara, ‘On the Marxist theory of war and peace’, p. 22.
34 Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations, p. 68.
Campbell Craig
8
248Nuclear weapons threaten absolute destruction, but by that very fact they can provide for a very
249effective form of defence. By threatening nuclear retaliation, any state, once it has attained the bomb,
250can deter an attack on itself relatively easily, and it can do so without having to spend enormous
251sums, deploy large standing armies, or keep up with the most advanced technologies, as the
252case of China today shows.35 For decades, the Soviet Union had faced an international environment
253of danger and, at times, the real possibility of national extinction. Nuclear deterrence
254gave Khrushchev a means of solving this problem. In the late 1950s, following on from the impli-
255cations of his peaceful coexistence announcement, Khrushchev declared that it was precisely this new
256kind of security that would permit the USSR to focus upon a new consumer economy, technological
257innovation, and spreading the Soviet model to the third world.36 Defence could be assured by
258deploying a small retaliatory arsenal, freeing up billions of roubles to pursue ‘economic-social’
259development.37
260Khrushchev’s policies during the 1950s provide us with a vivid example of the collision between a
261conventional Marxist doctrine undergirded by the whip of external necessity and the spectre of
262thermonuclear war. Not only did he conclude that nuclear war had rendered the idea of inevitable
263war obsolete; he also envisioned, in his declaration of peaceful coexistence, a different kind of
264international order in which the whip of external necessity would be eclipsed by economic compe-
265tition in a geopolitically stable realm. Trotsky, Lenin, and Stalin all believed that the whip of external
266necessity still obtained, and so an ongoing and convulsive interstate order in which war would
267someday occur. Khrushchev showed that it was possible for a Marxist to conclude otherwise.
268
Uneven and combined development and the nuclear dilemma
269The nuclear revolution persuaded Khrushchev that war must no longer be inevitable and that the
270unique threat of nuclear destruction necessitated a new Marxist conception of international politics.
271In this second section, I argue that the implications of this insight are fundamental and must be
272accounted for in any contemporary Marxian understanding of the international. To make this case
273speciﬁcally, I summarise Justin Rosenberg’s writings about uneven and combined development
274(UCD), and show how the whip of external necessity, upon which Trotsky’s conception of UCD
275relies, is transformed by the nuclear problem. I then conclude, following in particular an important
2761971 article by Berki, that this transformation forces a revival of classic Marxist notions of
277supranational human unity.
278Rosenberg has proposed, in several recent and path-breaking writings, that Trotsky’s idea of
279UCD can provide us with both a clear means of explaining epochal events in modern international
280history and a theory of international politics superior to that of the Structural Realist theory
35 On this point, see especially Kenneth Waltz, ‘Nuclear myths and political realities’, American Political Science
Review, 84:3 (1990), pp. 731–45.
36 See Timothy Naftali and Aleksandr Fursenko, Khrushchev’s Cold War (New York: Norton, 2006), pp. 243–8;
also see Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), ch. 2.
37 Attaining a bomb initially, of course, can be very expensive, especially for poor states. But once a nation goes
nuclear, its weapons can provide it with a relatively effective and inexpensive form of defence, should it choose
to rely upon a basic retaliatory arsenal, because it need not race to keep up with its rivals as pre-nuclear great
powers did. This fact is precisely what led Khrushchev to favour a basic arsenal in the late 1950s, and Chinese
leaders to do the same since the 1960s. For a thorough analysis, see Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs,
Nuclear Politics: the Strategic Causes of Proliferation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
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281of interstate anarchy.38 Let us summarise the main arguments of UCD as Trotsky, and Rosenberg,
282describe it. Conﬂict among societies is characterised by volatile competition for the resources necessary
283for development. It is not a conﬂict among undifferentiated and autonomous states, however, because
284at any moment in history there will always be some societies that are more advanced than others, and
285they pursue their wealth and resources in a system in which their economies are intertwined, to a
286greater or lesser degree, with one another. The picture of the international drawn by UCD is more
287integrative and dynamic than the one drawn by structural realists. It moves forward.
288UCD relies upon two ‘laws’, ontologically akin to Realist laws like the Balance of Power. The ﬁrst is
289the advantage of historical backwardness. This is simply the ability of less developed societies to
290appropriate advanced technologies and economic strategies rather than spending decades developing
291them themselves, allowing them to advance far more rapidly than would have been possible in
292isolation. ‘Almost without highways’, Trotsky wrote, ‘Russia was compelled to build railroads’,
293which it did overnight by borrowing technologies and expertise from the West.39
294The word ‘compelled’ gives us a ﬂavour of the second law, which of course is the whip of external
295necessity – the pressure upon states to make technological leaps in order to contend with their rivals,
296and therefore to acquire the economic means to do so. This policy is captured by Knei-Paz’s notion
297of ‘economic-military’ development: states prioritise military power and external security over
298domestic social welfare in their use of wealth and modern technologies. Trotsky emphasises that the
299whip applies most urgently to weaker states. The pressure upon them to develop lest they fall prey to
300more powerful ones pushes them to rush toward capitalism, a process that both integrates the whip
301with the advantage of historical backwardness, as his comment on ‘railroads’ indicates, and so
302intensiﬁes the larger dynamic of UCD. Rosenberg also stresses this point: for him, the whip simply
303‘compels weaker societies to adapt in order to survive’.40
304But the larger relevance of the whip of external necessity speaks to the problem of violent geopolitical
305competition in general: the fact that states qua states contend with one another in an incessantly
306dangerous environment, where a failure to keep up with technological advancements and to have enough
307funds to build a large military invites violent defeat at the hands of a more powerful adversary.41 To put
38 See particularly Justin Rosenberg, ‘Why is there no international historical sociology?’, European Journal of
International Relations, 12:3 (2006), pp. 307–40 and Rosenberg, ‘Kenneth Waltz and Leon Trotsky’. Also see
his ‘The philosophical premises of uneven and combined development’, Review of International Studies, 39:3
(2013), pp. 569–97; Neil Davidson, ‘Putting the nation back into “the international”’, Cambridge Review of
International Affairs, 22:1 (2009), pp. 9–28; Neil Davidson, ‘Uneven and combined development: Modernity,
modernism, revolution’, revolutionary reﬂections, 21 (3 February 2017), available at: {https://rs21.org.uk/
2017/02/03/revolutionary-reﬂections-uneven-and-combined-development-modernity-modernism-revolution-1-
the-classic-forms-of-uneven-and-combined-development/}; Jamie Allinson and Alexander Anievas, ‘The uses
and misuses of uneven and combined development: an anatomy of a concept’, Cambridge Review of Inter-
national Affairs, 22:1 (2009), pp. 47–67; and Thatcher, ‘Uneven and combined development’.
39 On historical backwardness, see Thatcher, ‘Uneven and combined development’; Davidson, ‘Putting the
nation back into “the international”’; Rosenberg, ‘Why is there no international historical sociology?’, p. 325;
Rosenberg, ‘Kenneth Waltz and Leon Trotsky’, pp. 200–3; Benjamin Selwyn, ‘Trotsky, Gerschenkron, and the
political economy of late capitalist development’, Economy and Society, 40:3 (2011), pp. 421–50; and
Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1962).
40 Rosenberg, ‘The philosophical premises of uneven and combined development’, p. 585.
41 Rosenberg, 'Kenneth Waltz and Leon Trotsky’, pp. 195–6, 199; Knei-Paz, The Social and Political Thought of
Leon Trotsky, pp. 90–4; Davidson, 'Uneven and combined development’.
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308it another way: obey the whip or become relatively weaker, with all that implied in the twentieth
309century. Trotsky sees this pressure as a state’s ‘ﬁerce struggle for existence’; Jamie Allinson describes
310it simply as ‘the need to survive in a competitive international system’.42 As Alexander Anievas
311shows, this imperative affected powerful countries as well as weaker ones during the ﬁrst forty years of
312the twentieth century;43 after the Second World War, to take another example, the Soviet Union had just
313defeated Nazi Germany and occupied much of Europe, but its frantic race to develop the atomic bomb
314and match US capabilities during the early Cold War provides us with a textbook example of the
315whip at work.44
316The interplay of the privilege of historical backwardness and the whip of external necessity, coming
317under the larger structural dynamic of UCD, gives both Trotsky and Rosenberg a powerful means
318of explaining the origins of the two most important events of the early twentieth century: the
319Russian revolution and the First World War. According to Trotsky, the startlingly rapid Russian
320development into a capitalist state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, driven in part
321by frantic fear of a rising Germany, but also by Russia’s defeat at the hands of Japan in 1905,
322established a small proletariat in major cities without any corresponding rise of a middle-class
323bourgeoisie or any spread of modernity whatsoever to the vast Russian countryside. This gave
324disproportionate political power to a radical working class and Marxist intelligentsia, particularly
325(as we have seen) at a time of devastating war and the moral bankruptcy of the Russian ruling
326class. Historical backwardness and geopolitical pressure, vivid and violent, weaved together
327seamlessly.45
328In a recent article, Rosenberg puts forward a preliminary means of explaining the origins of the First
329World War along similar lines. For him, the particular circumstances of German development in a
330context of European UCD is crucial: Germany’s relatively late turn to industrial capitalism created
331internal political divisions long smoothed over in competitors like Britain and France, who were able
332to exploit their early advanced economic power to establish far-ﬂung overseas empires. But its
333belated industrialisation also allowed Germany to take advantage of historical backwardness,
334thereby hastening its military development in the late nineteenth century. A politically immature
335Germany behind in the race for colonies but brimming with a modern industrial economy and a
336technologically advanced military was primed to demand an overturning of the European
337status quo.46
338In both cases geopolitical pressure, as it was conventionally and universally understood, plays a
339crucial role in the larger explanatory power of UCD. Neither analysis makes sense without
340incorporating the problem of major war, and the vivid spectre of national defeat it raised.47 The
341whip of external necessity is about obtaining the economic and technological means of waging major
342war, rather than leaving oneself outgunned and open to defeat. It is this core insight that must be
343stressed when asking how it is affected by the nuclear revolution.
42 James Allinson, ‘The Social Origins of Alliances: Uneven and Combined Development and the Case of Jordan
1955–57’ (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2012), p. 61.
43 Anievas, Capital, the State, and War.
44 SeeQ4 Holloway (1994) and Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the
Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), ch. 6.
45 Thatcher, ‘Uneven and combined development’, pp. 238–42; Rosenberg, ‘The philosophical premises of
uneven and combined development’, pp. 587–92; Allinson, ‘The Social Origins of Alliances’, pp. 62–3.
46 Rosenberg, 'Kenneth Waltz and Leon Trotsky’, pp. 205–24.
47 Rosenberg, 'The philosophical premises of uneven and combined development’, pp. 593–4.
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344We have suggested that the nuclear revolution fundamentally transforms attitudes about major war,
345and so therefore the very meaning of ‘geopolitical pressure’. Let us elaborate upon this claim and
346describe its effects upon contemporary international relations. Khrushchev concluded in the 1950s
347and 1960s that nuclear weapons do two things. First, he came to believe that a major war between
348the two superpowers would be a catastrophic disaster, unwinnable in any politically meaningful
349sense. The avoidance of great-power war became his overriding concern. Second, he concluded that
350even a small Soviet arsenal would provide his state with an effective and relatively inexpensive means
351of national protection. The United States, or any other state, would never deliberately launch a major
352war to threaten Soviet existence: the costs of doing so would be far greater than any beneﬁts.48
353Today, the nuclear revolution can wield conservative effects upon the foreign policies of major
354powers in precisely the same ways. Most obvious, industrialised, advanced states can either defend
355themselves by developing nuclear arsenals, or by allying themselves to nations that have done so: in
356either event they count on the existential danger of nuclear war to protect them.49 Thus the problem
357of national security that lies at the centre of the whip of external necessity imperative can be dealt
358with without having to devote large amounts of wealth to military spending or racing to keep up
359with the latest technologies, as has been seen for decades in Europe, but is also now the case with
360China, which overcame its ‘backwardness’ quite readily by building a nuclear arsenal in the 1960s,
361and continues to spend comparatively little on its military.50 All states, and particularly those with
362nuclear arsenals and their allies, possess a common and overriding interest to avoid major conﬂict
363and nuclear war.
364What is more, because large industrial states no longer have to frantically prepare for major war,
365they are more easily able to concentrate upon ‘economic-social’ rather than ‘economic-military’
366development, to focus upon development and innovation as Khrushchev hoped to do in the late
3671950s.51 This permits such states, of which contemporary China is again the most obvious example,
48 For broader arguments about these effects throughout the Cold War, see Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear
Revolution and Campbell Craig, ‘The nuclear revolution: a product of the Cold War, or something more?’, in
Richard Immerman and Petra Goedde (eds), Oxford Handbook on the Cold War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013), pp. 360–75. Whether the spectre of nuclear destruction will always deter states from
war remains a crucial question, even for scholars who otherwise basically agree with the logic of the nuclear
revolution. On this point, see especially Nick Ritchie, ‘Valuing and devaluing nuclear weapons’, Contemporary
Security Policy, 34:1 (2013), pp. 146–73.On the unusual state of contemporary scholarship about this
problem, see Benoit Pelopidas, ‘Nuclear weapons scholarship as a case of self-censorship in security studies’,
Journal of Global Security Studies, 1:4 (2016), pp. 326–36.
49 On this point, see Campbell Craig, ‘American power preponderance and the nuclear revolution’, Review of
International Studies, 35:1 (2009), pp. 27–44; Nuno Monteiro, Theory of Unipolar Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014); and Monteiro and Simone Paci, ‘Sharing the Burden: Unipolarity, Nuclear
Weapons, and World Government’, unpublished manuscript. Whether ‘extended deterrence’ reliably provides
security to non-nuclear states allied to nuclear powers is a long-standing question; see, for example, Jervis,
The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, chs 2–5. The point here is that states such as Germany, Japan, South
Korea, and many others have chosen to rely on it rather than racing to build modern weaponry as the whip of
external necessity would predict.
50 See Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France and the Enduring
Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); Charles Glaser and Steve
Fetter, ‘Should the United States reject MAD? Damage limitation and U.S. nuclear strategy toward China’,
International Security, 41:1 (2016), pp. 49–98.
51 Again, this argument applies primarily to large states which have a long-standing nuclear infrastructure;
maintaining a basic deterrent for them is relatively inexpensive, compared to the constant conventional arms
racing and deployment of large standing armies which many European states fearful of the whip spent
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368to pay far less attention to the military advancement of its rivals than major powers did in previous
369eras, and to zero in on domestic economic growth. During the past three decades, China has not
370followed the Soviet model of the postwar era, racing to match US power. Instead, it has accepted US
371preponderance and prioritised economic growth, in the belief that its basic nuclear arsenal will
372provide it with security irrespective of the US lead.52 China may still call itself a communist country,
373but the last thing it wants is international convulsion, as this would threaten both its newfound
374wealth and its physical existence.
375Thus, if the nuclear revolution and its effects on international politics are accepted as outlined above,
376it undermines or perverts every important element of Trotsky’s conception of the whip of external
377necessity. Nuclear weapons give major powers easy security and radically increase their aversion to
378major war. They therefore permit them to concentrate on social economic development rather than
379frantic military and technological competition; they incline them to suppress violent or convulsive
380change and support a conservative, institutional international order; and if a major war happens
381anyway it is now an irredeemable catastrophe rather than a normal event after which politics, and so
382the process of UCD, continue as usual.
383Of course, the foregoing claims about the transformative effects of the nuclear revolution are not
384universally accepted.53 Nuclear strategists, particularly in the United States, argue that nuclear war
385remains politically sensible under certain conditions and that states have considered, and will con-
386tinue to consider, waging it for rational political ends. This is a position generally associated with the
387right wing in the US, but if the whip as Trotsky characterised it is to remain salient with respect to
388geopolitical competition among the great powers today, its proponents must be prepared to make
389similar arguments. Trotsky was clear that the kind of war UCD foretold resulted not from accident
390or randomness but from the conventional material calculus facing states in his time: they prepare for,
391and ﬁght, wars to prevail in their ‘ﬁerce struggle for existence’. If this same kind of struggle continues
392to obtain despite the nuclear revolution, as the strategists argue, then UCD theorists must accept as
393well that states continue to have reason to wage nuclear war, and that they will do so for the same
394reasons that states fought in Trotsky’s day.54
395This kind of argumentation is not normally associated with Marxist IR, to say the least, but if it
396wishes to maintain that the whip of external necessity continues to shape great power geopolitics,
397it cannot reject, or ignore it. If UCD theorists agree that nuclear weaponry makes major war among
enormous proportions of their budgets on before 1945. For less developed states like Pakistan, North Korea, or
Iran, the initial acquisition of the bomb is very expensive indeed.
52 Craig, ‘American power preponderance and the nuclear revolution’; Monteiro, Theory of Unipolar Politics;
Fiona Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Assuring assured retaliation: China’s nuclear posture and
U.S.-China strategic stability’, International Security, 40:2 (2015), pp. 7–50.
53 For a thorough repudiation of them, see Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution,
forthcoming.
54 Other recent work on nuclear strategy includes Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, ‘The end of MAD? The nuclear
dimension of US primacy’, International Security, 30:4 (2006), pp. 7–44; Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, ‘The
new era of nuclear weapons, deterrence and conﬂict’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, 7:1 (2013), pp. 3–12;
Matthew Kroenig, ‘Nuclear superiority and the balance of resolve: Explaining nuclear crisis outcomes’,
International Organization, 67:1 (2013), pp. 141–71; Matthew Kroenig, ‘Facing reality: Getting NATO ready
for a new Cold War’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 57:1 (2015), pp. 49–70; Austin Long and Brendan
Rittenhouse-Green, ‘Stalking the secure second strike: Intelligence, counterforce, and nuclear strategy’, Journal
of Strategic Studies, 38:1–2 (2015), pp. 38–73.
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398large nuclear powers unthinkable, and deterrence easy for them to sustain, the whip of external
399necessity simply cannot explain this kind of politics in the way Trotsky, and Rosenberg, want it to
400do. If they want therefore to reject these implications of the nuclear revolution, they must maintain
401that nuclear war remains politically meaningful. They could concede that even though nuclear war
402may no longer be politically meaningful, it could still happen: but this move would simply avoid
403the problem, by putting to one side Trotsky’s core assumption that war occurs because states
404deliberately resort to it as a means of survival, as well as his view that such a war is incorporated
405within a progressive political process.
406UCD theorising claims that historical backwardness and the whip of external necessity explains
407international conﬂict among major states in a capitalist world better than any other structural
408theory. Today, the war that would ensue from such conﬂict would be fought among states that
409possess nuclear weapons. The implications of that must be confronted if UCD theorising is to
410apply in the contemporary era.
411
Back to Basics: the supranational third way
412Rosenberg revived the notion of UCD as a means of contending with Structural Realism, the
413prevailing theory of the international in IR. Central to his original argumentation was his claim that
414UCD provides us with a means of understanding systemic international change that Structural
415Realism does, and can, not. By accounting for the dynamics produced by competition among
416differentiated and intertwined nation-states, Rosenberg maintains, UCD is the ﬁrst theoretical
417conception to capture the international in a way that cannot be reduced to a domestic counterpart.
418The possession of nuclear weapons systems by many of these states raises fundamental problems
419for anyone attempting to use UCD to explain contemporary international politics. As I see it, this
420problem can be addressed in three ways.
421First, it can accept that the nuclear revolution affects the practice of interstate politics along the lines
422proposed above. To do so, however, UCD theorising must discard the whip of external necessity and
423its associated assumption of regular interstate violence: it must get rid of Trotsky’s assumption that
424major states frenetically compete with one another to prepare for war, that it is a matter of course that
425such a war will occur, and that this war constitutes part of a historical process. By eliminating the whip,
426however, the larger dynamic Trotsky foresees in UCD comes to an end. If major nuclear war is a
427catastrophe rather than a political event, then UCD amounts to a characterisation of an order in which
428either this catastrophe simply takes place, and it is nothing other than a disaster, or it does not take
429place. Under the latter scenario, uneven and combined economic competition among powerful nation-
430states continues, and the privilege of historical backwardness obtains, but the conﬂict that ensues is
431contained beneath a static geopolitical condition.55 Some nations may increase their wealth and power,
432and others decline, but the concomitant military competition that Trotsky regarded as a necessary
433ingredient of UCD is constrained beneath the level of actual great-power war.
434Second, it can reject the argument that the nuclear revolution has transformed interstate politics.
435This move would permit UCD theorists to retain the whip of external necessity, and so to regard
55 Nuno Monteiro, in his 2014 book Theory of Unipolar Politics, argues precisely that the United States ought
to maintain this static geopolitical order for the sake of international peace and stability (that is, nuclear
war-avoidance) even at the price of its economic preponderance.
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436the contemporary international order as subject to the same convulsive dynamics of economic
437and military competition as Trotsky identiﬁed a century ago. But they would also then have to
438agree with Trotsky’s view that a war produced by these convulsive forces would not constitute a
439senseless catastrophe but rather ﬁt within a progressive historical process that would continue
440onward after such a war. As we have shown, Trotsky, like Lenin and Stalin, believed war was
441a consequence of inevitable imperialist conﬂict, and while none of them actively welcomed war
442they all regarded it as a natural feature of historical development.56 It was this view that Khrushchev
443rejected in 1956.
444Third, it can reject interstate politics. Nuclear weapons demand the acceptance of either a static
445geopolitical order or the political utility of nuclear war for any materialist theorist who takes
446interstate great-power conﬂict as a given condition.57 For such Marxist theorists, there is nowhere
447else to turn, just as was the case in practice for the USSR.58 So as long as the state remains the unit in
448Rosenberg’s conception of the international – as long as he conceptualises the political order to be
449assessed as international – then he must choose between a UCD deprived of the whip and hence
450foreseeing only peaceful economic competition, or one in which nuclear war plays the same historical
451role that conventional war did for Trotsky.59
452Yet as Berki, and more recently Andrew Davenport, remind us, there is no reason why a Marxist
453approach to international relations must wed itself to the interstate model. In his seminal article ‘On
454Marxian thought and the problem of international relations’, Berki develops several points high-
455lighting the core conﬂicts between the original Marxist project and the embrace of the nation-state by
456twentieth-century Marxist-Leninists. Berki gleans from Marx that capitalism ‘perpetually engenders
457international conﬂict’, paving the way for the emergence of an alienated proletariat without national
458loyalty.60 The internationalist character of the working class is taken as a given: it embodies the
459dialectical advancement beyond a capitalist system characterised precisely by the ongoing existence
460of ethnic and national divisions.
461Indeed, Berki suggests, following Marx’s early writings, that intersocietal divisions and the wars
462fought under their banner are products of the international capitalist order, and so regarded equally
463by Marxism as doomed for the ash-heap of history.61 ‘Nations themselves in Marxian theory’, Berki
464insists, ‘are not absolute, but historical, and hence ephemeral units.’62 What this means, and here
56 On this point, see especially Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations.
57 For a cogent critique, see Anne Harrington, ‘Power, violence, and nuclear weapons’, Critical Studies on
Security, 4:1 (2016), pp. 91–112.
58 A third alternative would be a continuation of the interstate order in which nuclear weapons become devalued
and obsolete – see, inter alia, Ritchie, ‘Valuing and devaluing nuclear weapons’ and Jacques Hymans, ‘The
threat of nuclear proliferation: Perception and reality’, Ethics and International Affairs, 27:3 (2013),
pp. 281–98. While I personally doubt that this can happen, the more germane point is that the materialist logic
of UCD and the whip of external necessity cannot be readily answered by constructivist arguments
for obsolescence. For a more materialist argument on nuclear weapons from a constructivist scholar, see
Alexander Wendt, ‘Why a world state is inevitable’, European Journal of International Relations, 9:4 (2003),
pp. 491–542.
59 UCD of course could still be used effectively to explain prenuclear international politics. On this point,
see Davenport, ‘Marxism in IR’, p. 33.
60 Berki, ‘On Marxian thought and the problem of international relations’, p. 73.
61 See Davenport, ‘Marxism in IR’, pp. 31–3 and Adam Morton, ‘Disputing the geopolitics of the states system
and global capitalism’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20:4 (2007), pp. 599–617.
62 Berki, ‘On Marxian thought and the problem of international relations’, pp. 82–3.
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465Berki follows the ‘second-image’ reasoning of Kenneth Waltz’s foundational work Man, the
466State and War, is that the capitalist problematique cannot, by deﬁnition, be solved within an
467interstate order, even if all states became nominally socialist, a goal the Soviet Union ostensibly
468sought to achieve during the Cold War.63 An ‘economically integrated world’, Berki argues, ‘still
469consisting of separate nations is, whatever the internal structure of these nations, a capitalist
470world’. Globalised socialism, in a continuing interstate system, would simply be ‘the highest form of
471capitalism’.64
472In his recent article ‘Marxism in IR: Condemned to a realist fate?’, Andrew Davenport picks up on
473this theme. By accepting ‘geopolitical fragmentation’ as a given condition, Davenport argues,
474Rosenberg (and other Marxian scholars) politically cede the entire ﬁeld to Realism: Marxist analysis
475becomes a variant of Realism which stresses economic competition and change, but which lacks any
476political component to envision or demand something different from that fragmentation. As long as
477intersocietal competition, the multiplicity of the global order, is accepted, alternative theories such as
478UCD are useful to explain social change in the past but only ‘at the expense of effectively naturalising
479the Realist concept of political community’.65 For Realism, Davenport notes, ‘there is not and never
480has been a global social subject’: this is a fact Realists purport to be comfortable with.66 But it is an
481odd position for a Marxist to take.
482The tension between a cosmopolitan and supranational Marxism and one wedded to an interna-
483tional order of sovereign states is nothing new. Anti-nationalist Marxists such as Rosa Luxemburg
484fought this battle a century ago, and were defeated by nationalists like Lenin who saw in her
485internationalism a recipe for the destruction of the revolution and total victory for the capitalists.
486This debate has not gone away.67
487In 1916, Lenin and Trotsky could (and did) ﬁnesse the inconsistency between Marxist inter-
488nationalism and their own focus on state survival by assuming that the intra-imperialist convulsion
489and war produced by forces such as uneven and combined development would lead to the violent
490unravelling of the interstate order, which the new Soviet state would work to foment. But as we have
491seen, today the violent unravelling of the interstate order portends nuclear war. Unless one is
492prepared to argue that such a war remains justiﬁable, then the ﬁnesse available to Marxists a century
493ago no longer is available.
63 See Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), ch. 5. As I
understand it, Rosenberg in his path-breaking book, The Empire of Civil Society (London: Verson, 1994)
made exactly this point.
64 Berki, 'On Marxian thought and the problem of international relations’, p. 101, emphasis in original. See also
Anievas, Capital, the State, and War, p. 38.
65 Davenport, ‘Marxism in IR’, pp. 33, 40. See also George Lawson, ‘Rosenberg’s ode to Bauer, Kinkel and
Willich’, International Politics, 42:3 (2005), pp. 381–9.
66 The ultimate implication here, of course, is that Realists are ‘comfortable with’ the anarchical interstate order
they see as immutable culminating sooner or later in a global nuclear war. Because they are actually not
comfortable with that, many Realists search for normative solutions to that problem that quietly point at a
‘global subject’, even if they do not admit this. See Pelopidas, ‘Nuclear weapons scholarship’; Campbell Craig,
Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau and Waltz (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2003), ch. 7 and William Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform
(Cambridge: Polity, 2011).
67 For a spirited recent debate on this very question, see Jason Schulman (ed.), Rosa Luxemburg: her Life and
Legacy (New York: Palgrave, 2013).
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494This leaves the Marxist project with another place left to turn: cosmopolitan anti-nationalism.68
495Berki argues for a supranational position that partakes of Marx’s original vision of human unity
496and, crucially, equates intersocietal conﬂict with the capitalist system.69 The case for this can be
497made on his own terms, as his approach offers a far more decisive alternative to mainstream IR
498theories, and breaks cleanly from the abject failure of socialisms in one country over the past century,
499above all that of the USSR. If one adds the implications of the nuclear revolution expressed above to
500his argument, however, Berki’s alternative becomes far more compelling. What is more, by placing
501the logic of supranational nuclear politics and human unity against the current neoliberal/interstate
502order, the neo-nationalisms this dynamic has produced, and the omnicidal warfare it portends,
503scholars interested in reviving the insights of Marxist IR have the opportunity to develop an original
504praxeology that speaks vividly to the demands of the twenty-ﬁrst century rather than the history of
505the twentieth.
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